Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries

Law Journals

4-2020

Reynolds v. Tufenkjian, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (Apr. 9, 2020)
Brittni Tanenbaum

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Civil Law Commons, Civil Procedure Commons, and the Torts Commons

Recommended Citation
Tanenbaum, Brittni, "Reynolds v. Tufenkjian, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (Apr. 9, 2020)" (2020). Nevada Supreme
Court Summaries. 1300.
https://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/1300

This Case Summary is brought to you by the Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Boyd Law, an institutional repository
administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please
contact youngwoo.ban@unlv.edu.

Reynolds v. Tufenkjian, 136 Nev. Adv. Op. 19 (Apr. 9, 2020)1
EXECUTION TO SATISFY A JUDGMENT AND ASSIGNABILITY OF JUDGMENT
DEBTOR’S RIGHTS OF ACTION
Summary
The Court considered whether a party who purchased a judgment debtor’s rights of action
could motion the Court to substitute themselves in as the real party in interest and dismiss the
appeal. The Court held that only “things in action” that are otherwise assignable may be subject to
execution to satisfy a judgment. The Court concluded that tort claims for personal injury—
including fraud/intentional misrepresentation and elder exploitation—are generally not assignable.
The Court further concluded that tort claims for injury to property and contract-based claims,
unless the claims are personal in nature, are generally assignable. Therefore, the Court granted the
respondents’ motion in part and the appeal was dismissed in part.
Background
This opinion was issued in response to a motion from the respondents, Raffi Tufenkjian
and Luxury Holdings LV, LLC, to substitute themselves in the place of the appellants, Robert G.
Reynolds and Diamanti Fine Jewelers. Through the motion, the respondents additionally sought
to voluntarily dismiss this appeal because they purchased the appellants’ rights and interests in the
underlying district court action through a judgment execution sale.
In the underlying action, the appellants alleged breach of contract, fraud, and tort claims
against the respondents. After the appellants purchased a jewelry store from the respondents, the
appellants brought forward these claims in district court, alleging they relied to their detriment on
false representations from the respondents regarding the store’s value. The district court granted
summary judgment for the respondents and awarded the respondents $57,941.92 in attorney fees
and costs, pursuant to terms in the parties’ contract.
The appellants then appealed the judgment but did not obtain a stay of execution for the
award of attorney fees and costs; the appellants claimed they could not afford to post a supersedeas
bond. The respondents then obtained a writ of execution, allowing them to execute against
Reynolds’ personal property. Through the writ, the sheriff was directed to “levy and seize upon
any and all causes of action, claims, allegations, assertions or defenses of” the appellants, including
any from the underlying district court action.
The respondents then purchased “all the rights, title and interest of” the appellants in the
underlying district court action for $100 at the sheriff’s sale. Following this purchase, the
respondents sought to substitute themselves in place of the appellants (pursuant to NRAP 43) and
to voluntarily dismiss the appeal (pursuant to NRAP 42(b)). While the respondents asserted this
was proper because they now owned the claims, the appellants argued that granting the
respondents’ motion would prevent parties who are not financially able to satisfy a contested
judgment from asserting their rights to an appeal.
The Nevada Supreme Court then ordered supplemental briefing from the parties on the
issue of whether, through the execution sale, each of the appellants’ claims were properly assigned
to the respondents. The respondents argued, based on statutory law, that all claims were assigned
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properly. Appellants argued that the claims were not assignable because they were personal to
Reynolds, and that the Court should void the execution sale as a matter of public policy.
Discussion
Only assignable things in action are subject to execution under Nevada law
Under NRS 21.320, a district court can order a judgment debtor’s nonexempt property to
“be applied toward the satisfaction of the judgment” against the party. Under NRS 21.080(1), the
property that can be subject to this includes all of the judgment debtor’s personal property,
except property excluded under NRS 21.090. As defined by NRS 10.045, “personal property”
includes “things in action.” “Things in action” is defined as “a right to bring an action to recover
a debt, money, or thing.”2 This Court previously determined that “a ‘thing in action’ subject to
execution . . . does not include a party’s defenses to an action.”3
Jurisdictions vary regarding the interpretation of “things in action,” with some holding that
the term only includes claims that the debtor would otherwise be able to assign to another party.4
In other jurisdictions, “things in action” is viewed more broadly to include any claims for damages,
regardless of whether the claims could be otherwise assigned.5
This Court agrees with the former interpretation and holds that “things in action” only
includes the claims that a judgment debtor would otherwise have the power to assign. Nevada
prohibits certain causes of action from being able to be assigned, regardless of how the assignment
occurs.6
In Nevada, “a judgment creditor can acquire no greater right in the property levied upon
than that which the judgment debtor possesses,” therefore, “unless the debtor has the power to pass
the title to such property or interest in property by his . . . own act,” a judgment debtor’s property
cannot be subject to execution.7 Therefore, while the appellants’ claims are “things in action”
possessed by the appellants, if the claims cannot be assigned, the sheriff may not sell the
unassignable claims to satisfy the judgment against the appellants.8
Accordingly, the Court determined they must look at each of the appellants’ claims to
establish which claims were assignable and could therefore be executed on.
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Gallegos v. Malco Enters. of Nev., Inc., 127 Nev. 579, 582, 255 P.3d 1287, 1289 (2011) (quoting Chose in Action,
Black’s Law Dictionary (9th ed. 2009)).
3
Butwinick v. Hepner, 128 Nev. 718, 723, 291 P.3d 119, 121–22 (2012).
4
See, e.g., Holt v. Stollenwerck, 56 So. 912, 913 (Ala. 1911); Wittenauer v. Kaelin, 15 S.W.2d 461, 462–63 (Ky.
Ct. App. 1989).
5
See, e.g., O’Grady v. Potts, 396 P.2d 285, 289 (Kan. 1964); Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Dunn, 52 Ill.
260, 264 (1869).
6
See, e.g., Chaffee v. Smith, 98 Nev. 222, 223–24, 645 P.2d 966, 966 (1982); Gruber v. Baker, 20 Nev. 453, 469,
23 P. 858, 862 (1890); accord Miller v. Jackson Hosp. & Clinic, 776 So. 2d 122, 125 (Ala. 2000); Webb v. Gittlen,
174 P.3d 275, 278 (Ariz. 2008).
7
30 Am. Jur. 2d Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 118 (2017).
8
See, e.g., State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estep, 873 N.E.2d 1021, 1025–26 (Ind. 2007); see also Scarlett v.
Barnes, 121 B.R. 578, 580 (W.D. Mo. 1990); Carbo Indus., Inc. v. Alcus Fuel Oil, Inc., 998 N.Y.S.2d 571, 572
(Sup. Ct. 2014); cf. Craft v. Craft, 757 So. 2d 571, 572 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000).
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Tort claims for personal injury are generally not assignable
In general, Nevada prohibits the assignment of tort claims as a matter of public policy,
because many tort claims are personal in nature and intended to recompensate an injured party.9
Two of the appellants’ claims fall into the category of tort claims—fraud/intentional
misrepresentation and elder exploitation. Fraud/intentional misrepresentation is personal in
nature and unassignable.10 Whether elder exploitation claims are assignable was a matter of first
impression for the Court.
The Court concluded the appellants’ claims for fraud and elder exploitation were not
assignable and therefore not subject to execution, because the claims are personal to Reynolds. To
reach this conclusion, the Court looked at the plain language of the elder exploitation statue, which
clearly provides that the claim can only be brought by the elder person.11 Under NRCP 17(a), a
party can “sue in their own names without joining the person for whose benefit the action is
brought” under certain circumstances, but the Court determined those circumstances are not
present in this case.
Accordingly, the respondents did not acquire the claims for fraud/intentional
misrepresentation and elder abuse at the sheriff’s sale, therefore the Court denied the respondents’
motion to substitute in as the appellants and to dismiss these claims.
Tort claims for injury to property are generally assignable
Whether a claim for negligent misrepresentation is assignable was also a matter of first
impression for the Court.
Nevada limits claims for negligent misrepresentation to only claims that resulted in a
pecuniary loss.12 Negligent misrepresentation claims are only allowed in Nevada in the business
transaction context.13 Therefore, negligent misrepresentation claims are more akin to claims
seeking to recover for loss of property, than claims to recover for personal injury. Claims for
damages to property are generally assignable.14
Accordingly, because the appellants’ negligent misrepresentation claim was purely for a
pecuniary loss, the claim may be assigned and was therefore subject to execution. The Court
granted the respondents’ motion, in regards to the negligent misrepresentation claim, to substitute
in place of the appellants and to dismiss the appeal regarding that claim.
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See, e.g., Maxwell v. Allstate Ins. Co., 102 Nev. 502, 506, 728 P.2d 812, 815 (1986).
See Prosky v. Clark, 32 Nev. 441, 445, 109 P. 793, 794 (1910).
11
See Beazer Homes Nev., Inc. v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 120 Nev. 575, 579–80, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135 (2004).
12
Bill Stremmel Motors, Inc. v. First National Bank of Nevada, 94 Nev. 131, 134, 575 P.2d 938, 940 (1978); see
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 552 (Am. Law Inst. 1977); see also Goodrich & Pennington Mortg. Fund, Inc. v.
J.R. Woolard, Inc., 120 Nev. 777, 782, 101 P.3d 792, 795–96 (2004).
13
Barmettler v. Reno Air, Inc., 114 Nev. 441, 449, 956 P.2d 1382, 1387 (1988).
14
See, e.g., TMJ Haw., Inc. v. Nippon Tr. Bank, 153 P.3d 444, 452 (Haw. 2007); Gremminger v. Mo. Labor &
Indus. Relations Comm’n, 129 S.W.3d 399, 403 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004); 6A C.J.S. Assignments § 50 (2016).
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Contract-based claims are generally assignable
Contract-based claims, in Nevada, are generally assignable and therefore subject to
execution, unless the claims are personal in nature.15 In this case, the contract at issue was not a
personal service contract and the appellants presented no argument to depart from the general
rule regarding assignability of contract-based claims.
Accordingly, the Court granted the respondents’ motion to substitute themselves for the
appellants and to dismiss the appeal for this claim, in regards to the breach-of-contract claim.
Conclusion
The Court concluded that the appellants’ claims for fraud and elder exploitation were
personal in nature, and were therefore not assignable or subject to execution at the sheriff’s sale.
Therefore, the respondents’ motion to substitute themselves for appellants for these claims and to
dismiss the appeal for these claims was denied, because the respondents did not obtain the claims
for fraud and elder exploitation during the execution sale.
Regarding the appellants’ claims for negligent misrepresentation and breach of contract,
the Court determined these claims were assignable and subject to execution. Therefore, the Court
granted the respondents’ motion to substitute themselves for appellants for these claims and to
voluntarily dismiss the appeal for these claims.
Accordingly, the Court reinstated briefing for the parties solely for the summary judgment
on the appellants’ claims for fraud and elder exploitation.
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Gallegos, 127 Nev. at 582, 255 P.3d at 1289; see also 6 Am. Jur. 2d Assignments § 15 (2018). But see HD Supply
Facilities Maint., Ltd. v. Bymoen, 125 Nev. 200, 204–05, 210 P.3d 183, 185–86 (2009); Traffic Control Servs., Inc.
v. United Rentals Nw., Inv., 120 Nev. 168, 176, 87 P.3d 1054, 1060 (2004).
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